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Abstract—LTE/LTE-Advanced networks are known to be vul-
nerable to denial-of-service (DOS) and loss-of-service attacks
from smart jammers. In this article, the interaction between a
smart jammer and LTE network (eNode B) is modeled as an
infinite-horizon, zero-sum, repeated game, with asymmetric and
incomplete information. The smart jammer and eNode B are
modeled as the informed and the uninformed player, respectively.
The main purpose of this article is to construct efficient subop-
timal strategies for both players that can be used to solve the
above-mentioned infinite-horizon repeated game with asymmetric
and incomplete information. It has been shown in game-theoretic
literature that security strategies provide optimal solution in
zero-sum games. It is also shown that both players’ security
strategies in an infinite-horizon asymmetric game depend only on
the history of the informed player’s actions. However, fixed-sized
sufficient statistics are needed for both players to solve the above-
mentioned game efficiently. The smart jammer (informed player)
uses its evolving belief state as the fixed-sized sufficient statistics
for the repeated game. Whereas, the LTE network (uninformed
player) uses worst-case regret of its security strategy and its
anti-discounted update as the fixed-sized sufficient statistics.
Although fixed-sized sufficient statistics are employed by both
players, optimal security strategy computation in λ-discounted
asymmetric games is still hard to perform because of non-
convexity. Hence, the problem is convexified in this article by
devising “approximated” security strategies for both players
that are based on approximated optimal game value. However,
“approximated” strategies require full monitoring. Therefore, a
simplistic yet effective “expected” strategy is also constructed for
the LTE network (uninformed player) that does not require full
monitoring. The simulation results show that the smart jammer
plays non-revealing and misleading strategies against the network
for its own long-term advantage.
Index Terms—LTE; smart jamming; λ-discounted repeated
games; asymmetric information; linear programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
LTE/LTE-A ( [1], [2]) networks have been deployedaround the world providing advanced data, Voice-over-
LTE (VoLTE), multimedia and location-based services to more
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than 3.2 billion subscribers via 681 commercial networks [3].
However, it has been previously shown that Long Term Evolu-
tion (LTE) and LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) networks are vulner-
able to control-channel jamming attacks from smart jammers
who can “learn” network parameters and “synchronize” them-
selves with the network even when they are not attached to
it (cf. [4]–[9]). It is shown in the above-referenced articles
that such a smart jammer can launch very effective denial-
of-service (DOS) and loss of service attacks without even
hacking the network or its components. Recently, Garnaev and
Trappe [10] also looked into the possibility when the rival is
not smart in a jamming game with incomplete information.
Hence, pursuing autonomous techniques to address potentially
devastating wireless jamming problem has become an active
research topic.
In this article, the interaction between the LTE network and
the smart jammer is modeled as an infinite-horizon zero-sum
repeated 1 Bayesian game with asymmetric and incomplete
information. This article is similar to previously published
articles by the authors ( [5], [7], [9]) with the exception of
zero-sum and λ-discounted utility. The main purpose of this
article is to construct efficient suboptimal strategies for both
players to solve the above-mentioned infinite-horizon game
with asymmetric and incomplete information. Asymmetric
information games (cf. [11] - [15]) provide a rich frame-
work to model situations in which one player lacks complete
knowledge about the “state of the nature”. The player who
possesses complete knowledge about the state of the nature
is known as the informed player and the one who lacks
this knowledge is called the uninformed player. The smart
jammer is modeled as the informed row player, whereas
LTE eNode B is modeled as the uninformed column player.
The informed player deals with the ultimate and subtle tradeoff
of exploiting its superior information at the cost of revealing
that information via its actions or some other (unavoidable)
signals during repeated interactions with other players (cf.
[11], [13]). In most game-theoretic literature on repeated
games with asymmetric information, the informed player’s
strategy is computed based on how much information it should
reveal for an optimal or suboptimal policy. Furthermore, many
informed player zero-sum formulations model the uninformed
player as a Bayesian player in order to solve asymmetric
games (cf. [16] - [20]). However, relatively little work has
1A repeated game results when an underlying stage game is played over
many stages, and a player may take into account its observations about all
previous stages when making a decision at each stage [11].
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2been done to address the optimal strategy computation of the
uninformed player in an infinite-horizon repeated zero-sum
game with asymmetric information [21]. The main difficulty
arises from the fact that the uninformed player lacks complete
knowledge about the state of nature and informed player’s
belief state, which plays a crucial role in determining players’
payoffs and strategies. However, it has been shown in [14]
that the uninformed player’s security strategy does exist in
finite-horizon and infinite-horizon games with discounted and
bounded average cost formulations. Furthermore, it has been
shown in [22] that the uninformed player’s security strategy
does not depend on history of its own actions.
This article attempts to solve the above-mentioned LTE
network vs. smart jammer game by constructing efficient linear
programming (LP) formulations for both players’ “approxi-
mated” strategy computation and unique “expected” strategy
computation for the eNode B. The informed player’s (the smart
jammer) security strategy (optimal strategy in the worst-case
scenario) only depends on the history of its own actions and is
independent of the other player’s actions. The smart jammer
models the uninformed player as a Bayesian player, making
Bayesian updates with an evolving belief state. However, in
order to solve the infinite-horizon game efficiently, fixed-sized
sufficient statistics are needed for both players that do not
grow with the horizon. The evolving belief state serves as
sufficient statistics for the informed player in a λ-discounted
asymmetric repeated game. On the other hand, the uninformed
player’s (the eNode B) security strategy does not depend on
the history of its own actions, but rather depends on the history
of the informed player’s actions. However, the uninformed
player does not have access to the informed player’s belief
state and needs to find different fixed-sized sufficient statistics.
Fortunately, the uninformed player’s security strategy in the
dual game depends only on a fixed-sized sufficient statistics
that is fully available to it. Furthermore, the uninformed
player’s security strategy in the dual game, with initial worst-
case regret vector, also serves as its security strategy in the
primal game. Therefore, initial worst-case regret of its security
strategy and its anti-discounted update (which is the same
size as the cardinality of system state) is used as the fixed-
sized sufficient statistics for the uninformed player. Although
the above-mentioned sufficient statistics are fixed-sized for
both players in an infinite-horizon game, the optimal security
strategy computation in λ-discounted asymmetric game is still
hard to compute because of non-convexity [23]. Consequently,
“approximated” security strategies based on an approximated
optimal game value with guaranteed performance are com-
puted for both players that are based on a recent work by Li
and Shamma [20].
The above-mentioned “approximated” security strategies
require full monitoring 2. Since eNode B cannot observe smart
jammer’s actions with complete certainty, a unique “expected”
strategy formulation is also presented for the uninformed
player (the eNode B) that does not require full monitoring.
Both the smart jammer and the LTE eNode B exploit the
2Full monitoring requires that all players are capable of observing previous
actions of their opponents with certainty after each stage [11].
“approximated” and “expected” formulations to compute their
sub-optimal yet efficient strategies in order to maximize their
corresponding utilities. The main idea of the zero-sum formu-
lation is to find an (almost) optimal yet tractable strategy for
both players in the worst-case scenario. It is to be noted here
that the smart jammer is the maximizer in the zero-sum game
and the eNode B is the minimizer. Also, full monitoring is
only limited to observing actions of the opponent and, hence,
does not reveal any private information of ordinary UEs in the
network to the smart jammer.
A. Related Work
Game theory (cf. [11]–[15], [24], [25]) provides a rich
set of mathematical tools to analyze and address conflict
and cooperation scenarios in multi-player situations, and as
such has been applied to a multitude of real-world situations
in economics, biology, cyber security, multi-agent networks,
wireless networks (cf. [26]–[28]) and more. In this article, the
interaction between the LTE network and the smart jammer is
modeled as an infinite-horizon zero-sum repeated game with
asymmetric information.
Zero-sum repeated game formulations have been studied
extensively in the game-theoretic literature, including asym-
metric information cases, such as Chapter 5 of [11], Chapter 4
of [13], Chapters 2 - 4 of [14], and Chapter 2 of [25]. However,
most of the prior work on asymmetric zero-sum repeated
games deals with the informed player’s viewpoint. For exam-
ple, [11] and [13] pointed out that the informed player might
reveal its superior information implicitly by its actions and,
hence, may want to refrain from certain actions in order not
to reveal that information. In case of full monitoring, playing
non-revealing strategy for the informed player is equivalent
to not using its superior information [11]. Furthermore, [14]
showed that the informed player’s belief state (conditional
probability of the game being played given history of informed
player’s actions) is its sufficient statistics to make long-run
decisions. Hence, many informed player’s strategies (cf. [16]
- [20]) use the belief state as their sufficient statistics. However,
[23] showed that computing the optimal value of the infinite-
horizon repeated game is non-convex and identified com-
putational complexities involved in solving infinite-horizon
games. Therefore, the above-mentioned articles approximate
the optimal game value via linear programming. On the other
hand, limited work has been done for the uninformed player’s
optimal strategy computation as compared to the vast research
done for the informed player [21]. It is, however, known that
the uninformed player’s security strategy exists in infinite-
horizon repeated zero-sum games, and that it does not depend
on the history of its own actions (cf. [19], [22]). But, effi-
cient computation of the uninformed player’s optimal security
strategy is still an open problem. Recently, [21] suggested that
the uninformed player could use its expected payoff for each
candidate game as sufficient statistics since it is unaware of the
game being played. Similarly, [19] used realized vector payoff
as the uninformed player’s sufficient statistics to compute its
efficient but suboptimal strategy in finite-horizon zero-sum
repeated games. However, it is to be noted here that all of
3these formulations are based on commonly-assumed notion of
full monitoring in which players can perfectly observe their
opponent’s actions. This article also utilizes the notion of full
monitoring for its “approximated” strategy computation.
Although there has been quite a lot of work done on
infinite-horizon repeated zero-sum games with asymmetric
information, there does not exist any tractable non-zero-sum
formulations for the uninformed player that can be used for its
optimal strategy computation in infinite-horizon asymmetric
repeated games. Most of the classic general-sum (non-zero-
sum) game-theoretic literature like Chapter 6 of [11] and
Chapters V and IX of [15] focus on the characterization and
existence of equilibria in repeated games with asymmetric
information, and deal with the optimal strategy construction
for the full monitoring case. Chapter V of [15] also suggests
using approachability theory for the construction of the unin-
formed player’s strategy for the full monitoring case. However,
none of these formulations result in efficient computation of
the uninformed player’s optimal strategy. This problem gets
further complicated for general-sum (non-zero-sum) games
with imperfect monitoring. For example, [29] pointed out that
the solution of a general-sum (non-zero-sum) stochastic game
with both incomplete knowledge and imperfect monitoring is
an open problem and there is no well-established solution
available so far. To the best of our knowledge, that is still
the case for repeated as well as stochastic general-sum (non-
zero-sum) games (e.g., see [21], [34]). This is one of the main
reasons that the LTE network and smart jammer interaction is
not modeled as a general-sum (non-zero-sum) game in this
paper.
Bayesian approaches have been widely used to solve asym-
metric information problems in which updated belief state can
be used as sufficient statistics for the informed player. Belief
state often serves as a tool for updating the internal notion of a
player’s knowledge related to another. For example, [16] - [20]
modeled the uninformed player as a Bayesian player in order
to compute the informed player’s suboptimal strategies in
repeated zero-sum games. Similarly, [30] - [32] used Bayesian
approaches to devise an uninformed player’s strategy based on
expected payoff, and [29] employed Bayesian Nash-Q learning
in an incomplete information stochastic game and used Bayes’
formula to update belief of an Intrusion Detection System
(IDS). Another commonly used technique to address lack of
information problems is state estimation. For example, [33]
used a Kalman filter to estimate the state of an observable,
linear, stochastic dynamic system in an infrastructure security
game. However, the system of interest and game dynamics
in this article are nonlinear and may not be completely-
observable. Therefore, the applicability of state estimation
techniques is very limited.
To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any
explicit formulations for the optimal strategy computation of
the uninformed player in an infinite-horizon repeated zero-sum
game with asymmetric information [21]. However, it has been
shown in [14] that the uninformed player’s security strategy
does exist in finite-horizon and infinite-horizon games with
discounted and bounded average cost formulations. Moreover,
it has been shown in [22] that the uninformed player’s security
strategy does not depend on history of its own actions. Never-
theless, a recent LP formulation in [20] provides an efficient
technique for the explicit “approximated” strategy computa-
tion of the uninformed player in infinite-horizon asymmetric
repeated zero-sum games, but with the assumption of full
monitoring.
Furthermore, there are multiple differences between this
article and [9] which is focused only on estimating the jammer
type at the beginning of the game and as such strategies com-
puted in that article cannot be used for long-term interaction.
On the other hand, this article is focused on computing both
players’ strategies for very long-term interaction. Moreover,
smart jammer in [9] is modeled as a myopic player (i.e.,
it only cares about short-term utility) as opposed to being
modeled as a strategic player in this article. In addition, the
interaction between the smart jammer and the eNode B in [9]
is modeled as a general-sum (non-zero-sum) game without
perfect monitoring as opposed to zero-sum formulation in
this article. The eNode B exploits “jamming sense” part of
the algorithm presented in [9] to invoke strategy computation
algorithms discussed in this article. On the other hand, the
article [20] written by co-authors Li and Shamma is focused
on an approximated yet efficient LP formulation for both
players’ strategies in an abstract repeated zero-sum game with
perfect monitoring. This “approximated” strategy construction
technique is further extended to realistic smart jammer and
LTE network interaction in this article. On top of that, a unique
“expected” strategy formulation is also explored in the article.
Smart jamming problem in LTE networks has been studied
extensively lately. However, to the best of our knowledge, none
of the articles published so far studied the smart jamming
problem in LTE networks in a game-theoretic manner.
II. SMART JAMMING IN LTE NETWORKS
Potential smart jamming attacks and suggested network
countermeasures are the same as described in [5]. They are
briefly discussed here for the sake of completeness.
A. Smart Jamming Attacks on an LTE Network
The set of smart jammer’s pure actions consists of the
following jamming attacks 3:
1) a1j = Inactive (no jamming): corresponds to default UE
operation when no jammer is active in the network.
2) a2j = Jam CS-RS: corresponds to OFDM pilot jam-
ming/nulling extensively studied in the literature. This
action prevents all UEs from demodulating data channels
by prohibiting them from performing coherent demod-
ulation, degrades cell quality measurements and blocks
initial cell acquisition in the jamming area.
3) a3j = Jam CS-RS + PUCCH: corresponds to jamming
PUCCH in the UL in addition to DL CS-RS jamming.
This action could be more catastrophic for Connected
mode UEs as compared to jamming the CS-RS alone
due to eNode B’s loss of critical UL control information
but requires more sophisticated dual-band jamming.
3See [1] or [2] for the description of various LTE channels
44) a4j = Jam CS-RS + PBCH + PRACH: corresponds to
jamming DL broadcast channel PBCH and UL random
access channel PRACH in addition to pilot nulling. This
action is intended to block reselection/handover of UEs
from neighboring cells and block synchronization of idle
mode and out-of-sync UEs.
5) a5j = Jam CS-RS + PCFICH + PUCCH + PRACH:
corresponds to jamming CS-RS and PCFICH in the
DL and jamming PUCCH and PRACH in the UL. This
action is intended to cause loss of DL and UL grants,
radio link failures and loss of UE synchronization
mostly in Connected mode UEs.
Although jamming individual control channels may also
cause denial-of-service (DOS) attacks, jamming effects may
not have specific consequences desired by the smart jammer.
For example, jamming CS-RS alone could be limited to
specific part of a cell depending on the jammer location and its
transmit power and jamming PBCH alone may only prevent
a small fraction of UEs to not reselect/handover to the cell
if they have not visited that particular cell recently. Even
though concatenation of jamming multiple control channels
requires distribution of the jammer’s transmit power among
all jamming activities, it allows the smart jammer to target
specific aspects of network operation, such as cell reselec-
tion/handover, data download and upload etc.
In addition to the above-mentioned pure actions, the smart
jammer uses its probability of jamming (pj) and transmit
power (Pj) to decide when to jam the network and how much
power to use during a particular jamming attack. The duty
cycle of each action is also implicitly modeled in the utility
function of the jammer. Thus, the smart jammer launches
denial-of-service (DoS) and loss of service attacks on the
LTE network by employing these actions and can be easily
implemented using a software-defined radio (SDR) and a
colluding UE.
B. Suggested Network Countermeasures
It is proposed that the network can use the following (pure)
countermeasures in case of a jamming attack:
1) a10 = Normal (default action): corresponds to default
network operation.
2) a20 = Increase CS-RS Transmit Power: corresponds
to pilot boosting in order to alleviate CS-RS jamming
at the expense of transmitting other channels at lower
transmit power than normal operation.
3) a30 = Throttle: corresponds to a specific threat mech-
anism when all active UEs’ DL/UL grants (and hence
throughputs) are throttled.
4) a40 = Change eNode B fc + SIB 2: corresponds to
a specific interference avoidance mechanism when the
network “relocates” its carrier frequency fc to a different
carrier within its allocated band/channel and rearranges
itself into a lower occupied bandwidth configuration.
It also changes its PRACH configuration parameters in
SIB 2 to alleviate PRACH jamming.
5) a50 = Change eNode B Timing: corresponds to a
specific interference avoidance mechanism in which
network “resets” its frame/subframe/slot/symbol timing
and SIB 2 parameters. Ongoing data sessions would be
handed over to neighboring cells before the “reset” and
the cell would not be available during transition.
It is to be noted here that the above-mentioned countermea-
sures do not require any exogenous information or significant
changes in 3GPP specifications and can be implemented easily
with current technology. Furthermore, the network is not aware
of jammer’s location, jamming waveform, and its probability
of jamming pj . Also, the average duty cycle and eNode B’s
transmit power (P0) determine the power consumption of the
network, modeled in its utility function. The curious reader is
encouraged to see [9], [34] for further details on smart jammer
actions and network countermeasures.
III. LTE NETWORK & SMART JAMMER DYNAMICS
A. Network Model
The network model used in this article is the same as
developed in [9] and is briefly discussed here for the sake
of completeness.
UEs arrive in the cell according to a homogeneous 2D
Stationary Spatial Poisson Point Process (SPPP) with the rate
Λ per unit area and are uniformly distributed over the entire
cell conditioned on the total number of users N. The large-scale
path loss is modeled using the Simplified Path Loss Model [35].
Pr(dBm) = Pt(dBm) +K(dB)− 10γlog10
(
d
d0
)
(1)
where Pr is the received power, Pt is the transmitted power,
K(dB) = 20log10
(
λ
4pid0
)
is a constant, γ is the path
loss exponent, d is the distance between the transmitter and
receiver, and d0 is the outdoor reference distance for antenna
far field. The small-scale multipath fading is modeled using
exponentially distributed Rayleigh-faded channel gains at each
subcarrier. Thus, the instantaneous SINR Γ[k] of a particular
OFDM subcarrier k is modeled as follows:
Γ[k] =
P0[k]|h|2K(R0d0 )−γ
σ2 + Pj [k]|g|2K(Rjd0 )−γ
(2)
where P0 and Pj are desired and jammer transmit powers,
|h|2 and |g|2 are exponentially distributed Rayleigh-faded
channel gains, R0 and Rj are large-scale distances from
desired transmitter and jammer respectively, γ is the path loss
exponent, and σ2 is the noise variance at the receiver. It is
assumed that Inter-Cell Interference (ICI) is independent of
jamming and, hence, any residual ICI can be lumped together
in the noise variance σ2 for the scope of this article. It is
further assumed that σ2 is the same at all receivers.
The SINR in (2) can be re-written in terms of the Carrier-
to-Jammer ratio C/J as follows:
Γ[k] =
(CJ )|h|2K(R0d0 )−γ
( σ
2
Pj [k]
) + |g|2K(Rjd0 )−γ
(3)
5Equations (2) and (3) are used to model the SINR of nar-
rowband flat-faded signals and channels like CS-RS, PCFICH,
PUCCH etc.. However, wideband channels like PDSCH and
PUSCH cannot be modeled using (2) or (3). Furthermore,
SINR estimation is done in the frequency domain.
In addition, the LTE network’s mth user’s DL PDSCH
throughput Rm(k, l) in the kth resource block during the lth
subframe is modeled as a fraction  ∈ (0, 1] of Shannon’s
AWGN Channel Capacity as described in (4).
Rm(k, l) = WRB log2[1 + ΓPDSCHm (k, l)] (4)
where WRB is the bandwidth of a single RB i.e. 180 kHz. For
the purposes of this article, it is assumed that  = 1.
The mth user’s total throughput in a given subframe is
the sum of its assigned RBs’ throughput for that particular
subframe. It is modeled that the eNode B uses a Proportional
Fair Scheduling (PFS) [36] algorithm to allocate resources to
its users. User m is allocated in resource block k during the lth
subframe if the ratio of its achievable instantaneous data rate
and long-term average throughput in (5) is the highest among
all the active users in the network. The long-term average
throughput of user m, Rm(l) during subframe l is computed
using the recursive equations (5) and (6) below:
mˆk = arg max
m′=1,...,N
{Rm′(k, l)
Rm′(l)
}
(5)
Rm(l) =
(
1− 1
tc
)
Rm(l−1) + 1
tc
K∑
k=1
Rm(k, l)I(mˆk = m)
(6)
where tc represents fairness time window, and I is an indicator
function.
In general, the overall LTE network dynamics can be
modeled as a highly nonlinear dynamical system described
by:
χ+ = f(χ, θ, a0, aj , ω) (7)
where χ ∈ RM×K represents state of the network (not to
be confused with the game-theoretic state of nature θ) with
each row corresponding to the user m ∈ M , including K
elements for each user (such as, SINRs Γm of its control and
data channels, and average throughput for user m ∈ M ); θ
represents the game-theoretic state of nature (jammer type)
described in the next section; a0 ∈ A0 represents eNode B
action; aj ∈ Aj represents jammer’s action and ω character-
izes the randomness in the network induced by the channel,
arbitrary user locations, varying transmit power levels, PFS
scheduling and other sources of randomness in the network.
Thus, the network dynamics are modeled as a Partially-
Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP).
Evidently, it is nontrivial and intractable to model the LTE
network and smart jammer dynamics analytically. Hence, these
abstracted dynamics are simulated in MATLAB without losing
any modeling fidelity. Although this article can be used as a
building block for more complicated scenarios, multi-cell and
multi-jammer scenarios are beyond the scope of this article.
B. Game-Theoretic Model
Notations: For the rest of this paper, the following
mathematical notations are used. Let A be a finite set. Its
cardinality is denoted by |A|, and the set of all probability
distributions over A is indicated by ∆(A).
1) Game Model: The interaction between the LTE network
and the smart jammer is modeled as a strictly competitive
infinite-horizon zero-sum repeated Bayesian game G with
asymmetric and incomplete information, with the smart
jammer as the informed (row) player and the eNode B as
the uninformed (column) player. Infinite-horizon games are
used to model situations in which horizon length is not fixed
in advance and there is a non-zero probability at the end of
each stage that the game will continue for next stage (e.g., see
[12]). The game G is described by
• N = {smart jammer, eNode B}, the set of players,
• Θ, the set of states of nature (jammer types),
• p0 ∈ ∆(Θ), the prior probability distribution on Θ, which
is common knowledge,
• Aj and A0, the set of pure actions of the smart jammer
and the eNode B, respectively as described in Section II,
where aj ∈ Aj and a0 ∈ A0 represent corresponding
elements in these sets,
• H, a set of sequences such that each H ∈ H is a history
of observations,
• Ii, the information partition of player i and
• Ui : Θ ×Aj ×A0 → R, the single-stage utility function
of player i, Uθi ∈ R|Aj |×|A0| the utility matrix of player
i given jammer type θ whose element Uθi (aj , a0) is
Ui(θ, aj , a0), ∀aj ∈ Aj , a0 ∈ A0.
Following the convention used in game-theoretic literature
including [20], the informed player, i.e., the smart jammer
is played as the maximizer (row player), whereas the
uninformed player, i.e., the eNode B is played as the
minimizer (column player). It is to be noted here that
ordinary user equipments (UEs) are not modeled as players
in this article.
2) Jammer Types: The type θ ∈ Θ of smart jammer is
classified as:
• Type I: Cheater
• Type II: Saboteur
The type Cheater is used to model the jammer with the
intent of getting more resources for itself as a result of
reduced competition among UEs. Thus, a cheating UE is
always present in the network with an active data session. On
the other hand, the type Saboteur is used to model the jammer
with the intent of causing highest possible damage to the
network resources. Thus, a sabotaging UE may be unattached
to the network. It is to be noted here that the “Normal
(inactive)” jammer type is not modeled here because jammer
is not present in that state and it is in the best interest of
the network to play default normal action in that case. The
strategy algorithms presented in this article are invoked when
6jammer is present in the network and/or when jamming is
sensed by the network using “jamming sense” part of the
algorithm presented in [9]. It is to be noted here that absence
of jamming does not imply jammer’s absence as an active
smart jammer may also decide to play “inactive” action as
part of its strategy during an attack.
3) Strategies: Both the network and the jammer are
modeled as rational and strategic. By definition, a pure
strategy of a player is a mapping from each non-terminal
history to a pure action and a mixed strategy is a probability
measure ∆ over the set of its pure strategies. A behavioral
strategy specifies a probability measure ∆ over its available
actions at each stage when an action needs to be taken [12].
Also, the best response (BR) is the strategy (or strategies) that
produces the most favorable outcome for a player given other
players’ strategies [24]. Two types of suboptimal security
strategies for infinite-horizon game are presented in this
article, as discussed in Section V.
4) Information Partitions: The jammer is informed of its
own type θ. However, eNode B is only informed about the
prior probability distribution p0 ∈ ∆(Θ). This results in a
game with asymmetric information, with lack of information
on the network side, making eNode B the uninformed player.
5) Observable Signals: It is assumed that for the
“approximated” strategy computation, players can observe
each other’s actions with certainty after each stage, i.e.
full monitoring requirements are satisfied. This is a very
widely used assumption used in classic and modern game-
theoretic literature (e.g., Chapter 6 of [11]). The network
can distinguish between smart jammer’s different actions at
high SNR and can make reasonable estimates at low SNR.
However, the imperfect monitoring case is beyond the scope
of the “approximated” formulation presented in this article.
On the other hand, the “expected” strategy formulation for
repeated games does not require any full monitoring.
6) Utilities: Both players’ utility functions are based on
their key performance indicators (KPIs) and are defined to re-
flect a strictly competitive (zero-sum) setting, i.e., one player’s
gain is the other player’s loss as described by:
U0 = −Uj (8)
When the system state is Cheater, the zero-sum utility
function is simplified as
Ucj (aj , a0) = αRcEw
[
δ(Rnormc )(aj , a0)
]
− αNcEw
[
N normc (aj , a0)
] (9)
where δ(Rnormc ) represents change in the Cheater’s normalized
average throughput from the baseline scenario, αRc represents
its corresponding weight, N normc represents the normalized
average number of Connected mode UEs in the network
when the Cheater is present, αNc represents its corresponding
weight and Ew represents expectation with respect to random-
ness caused by w as mentioned in (7).
The Cheater tries to maximize (9) in order to increase its
throughput from the baseline scenario and reduce the number
of Connected mode UEs in the network which at the same
time reduces the competition for limited network resources.
The eNode B, on the other hand, tries to minimize (9) to do
the opposite, hence, creating a proper zero-sum game.
Similarly, the zero-sum utility function is defined in (10)
when the system state is Saboteur.
Usj (aj , a0) = −αNsEw
[
N norms (aj , a0)
]
− αReNBEw
[
RnormeNB (aj , a0)
] (10)
where N norms represents the normalized average number of
Connected mode UEs in the network when Saboteur is present,
αNs represents its corresponding weight, RnormeNB represents
eNode B’s normalized average throughput/UE, αReNB rep-
resents its corresponding weight and Ew, again, represents
the expectation with respect to randomness caused by w as
mentioned above.
The Saboteur tries to maximize the opposite (negative
of) eNode B utility defined in terms of average number of
Connected mode users and average throughput/UE, hence,
defining the zero-sum game.
Note that there are no “unilateral” fixed costs associated
with either player in the above-mentioned zero-sum construc-
tion. This means that the game would be played without
modeling higher “fidelity” parameters like players’ duty cycles
and implicit cost associated with eNode B actions like ’f
Change’ and ’Timing Change’. However, this “fidelity” loss
does not affect the inherent nature of smart jammer and net-
work interaction and, hence, can be discounted. It is also to be
noted here that the utility functions are different for different
jammer type, which is a common phenomenon in Bayesian
games. Furthermore, the key performance indicators (KPIs)
are functions of observable parameters only, for example,
eNode B’s utility is a function of parameters observed from
Connected Mode UEs.
Interestingly, none of the players need to compute their
utilities explicitly as it is not used to make strategy decisions
in repeated games as discussed later in Section V. The payoffs
are received by both players as a result of the interaction
between the smart jammer and the network. Even though
the network does not know the jammer type, it can compute
expected utility for minimization based on the prior (and
updated belief) probability of specific jammer type presence.
7) Game Play: At the beginning of the game, nature flips a
coin and selects θ ∈ Θ (jammer type) according to p0 ∈ ∆(Θ),
which remains fixed for the rest of the game. The jammer is
informed about its selected type but eNode B is not. However,
in a repeated game, eNode B’s history of interaction with the
jammer evolves with time which may affect its belief about θ.
7IV. SINGLE-SHOT GAME
The single-shot game is played between the smart jammer
as the maximizer (row player) and the network as the mini-
mizer (column player). The maxmin value for the row player
for given state θ is denoted by v; whereas the minmax value
for the column player is denoted by v. It is widely known that
v ≤ v is always true. However, when v = v is satisfied, then
the game is said to have a value v = v = v. The legendary
von Neumann’s celebrated Minmax Theorem states that any
matrix game has a value v in mixed strategies and the players
have optimal strategies [14], i.e., the minmax solution of a
zero-sum game is the same as the Nash equilibrium. Both
players play their security strategies in a zero-sum game to
guarantee the best outcome under the worst conditions, due to
the game’s strictly competitive (zero-sum) nature.
The single-shot game simulation results are obtained from
a Monte-Carlo simulation of LTE network and smart jammer
dynamics as dicussed in Section III. The following parameters
are used for our simulations:
• Carrier-to-jammer power ratio: C/J = 0 dB,
• Probability of jamming: pj = 1.0,
• Weight of no. of Connected UEs for Type I: αNc = 4,
• Weight of no. of Connected UEs for Type II: αNs = 5,
• Weight of average throughput for Type I: αRc = 5,
• Weight of average throughput for Type II: αReNB = 4.
The following simulation results are obtained for the single-
shot game when the jammer type is Cheater. The first element
of the utility matrices represent the baseline scenario when
no jammer is active in the network and network is playing its
default normal action.
Ucj =

−1.0000 −1.0239 −2.2464 −1.3840 −1.0000
−0.9642 −1.0029 −2.2130 −1.3398 −0.9642
−0.8016 −0.8239 -2.0553 −1.1366 −0.8016
−0.9714 −1.0078 −2.2212 −1.3525 −0.9714
−0.8181 −0.8399 −2.0716 −1.1610 −0.8181

Similarly, the simulation results for the single-shot game
when the jammer type is Saboteur are presented below.
Usj =

−1.0000 −0.9933 −0.5635 −0.9128 −1.0000
−0.9879 −0.9805 −0.5446 −0.9022 −0.9898
−0.9905 −0.9805 −0.4578 −0.8849 −0.9867
−0.9900 −0.9827 −0.5498 −0.9050 −0.9919
−0.9895 −0.9800 −0.4666 −0.8880 −0.9875

For the complete information case when the network is
aware of the jammer type Cheater, the game has a single
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, (aj∗, a0∗) = (’Jam CS-RS
+ PUCCH’, ’Throttling’), with the game value v = −2.0553,
satisfying the following equation.
Ucj (aj∗, a0∗) = min
a0∈A0
Ucj (aj∗, a0)
= max
aj∈Aj
Ucj (aj , a0∗)
For the complete information case when the network is
aware of the jammer type Saboteur, the game does not have
any pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. If the players are allowed
to use mixed strategies, i.e., a probability distribution over a
player’s action set, then there exists a mixed strategy Nash
Equilibrium (x∗, y∗), where x∗ = [0 0.51 0 0 0.49]T ∈
∆(Aj), and y∗ = [0.59 0 0 0 0.41] ∈ ∆(A0) with the game
value v = −0.9887, satisfying the following equation. This
mixed strategy probability distribution loosely translates to
playing (’Jam CS-RS’, ’Jam CS-RS + PCFICH + PUCCH
+ PRACH’) and (’Normal’, ’Timing Change’) equally likely
by the jammer and the eNode B respectively.
Ex∗,y∗(Usj (aj , a0)) = min
y∈∆(A0)
Ex∗,y(Usj (aj , a0))
= max
x∈∆(Aj)
Ex,y∗(Usj (aj , a0))
where Ex,y(Usj (aj , a0)) = xTUsj y is the expected value of
the single-stage utility given mixed strategies x and y. Given
the utility matrix, linear programming is used to compute the
Nash Equilibirum [12] with x∗ and y∗, and the game value v.
However, in the asymmetric information case, eNode B
only knows the probability distribution p0 over jammer’s
types which is public information, while the jammer knows
exactly its own type. Knowing its own type, the jammer
can use a different strategy for different states θ. Therefore,
in the asymmetric game, jammer’s mixed strategy x is a
mapping from Θ to ∆(Aj). The single-shot asymmetric game
still has a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium (x∗, y∗), where
x∗ ∈ ∆(Aj)|Θ| and y∗ ∈ ∆(A0) satisfy
Ep0,x∗,y∗(Uθj (aj , a0)) = min
y∈∆(A0)
Ep0,x∗,y(Uθj (aj , a0))
= max
x∈∆(Aj)|Θ|
Ep0,x,y∗(Uθj (aj , a0))
where Ep0,x,y
[Uθj (aj , a0)] = ∑θ∈Θ pθ0xθTUθj y is the ex-
pected value of the single-stage utility given the initial prob-
ability p0 and mixed strategies x and y. It is to be noted here
that the utility functions are common knowledge. Although
eNode B is unaware of the jammer type, it knows that the
utility function is either Ucj or Usj given that the jammer is
present in the network. For a given prior probability p0, the
eNode B can evaluate its expected utility Ep0,x,y
[Uθj (aj , a0)]
whose minmax value (i.e., the game value) is a function of
prior probability p0. Since, p0 is fixed, the game value shall
also remain fixed. The Nash Equilibrium for the asymmetric
information game can be computed by solving an LP by setting
the time horizon to a single stage [37].
V. INFINITE-HORIZON ASYMMETRIC REPEATED GAME
STRATEGY ALGORITHMS
The repetition of a zero-sum game in its basic form does
not warrant further study as the players can play their optimal
security strategies i.i.d. at each stage to guarantee an optimal
game value [14]. However, in repeated asymmetric games,
playing the optimal strategy in a single-stage asymmetric game
i.i.d. at each stage does not guarantee the player the optimal
game value [14]. Therefore, the repeated game needs to be
studied further.
8It is assumed that both players’ actions are publicly known
at the end of each stage. The jammer’s action history at
stage t ≥ 1 is Hjt = {aj1, aj2, . . . , ajt−1}, and Hjt denotes
the set of all possible action histories of the jammer at stage
t. Similarly, eNode B’s action history at stage t ≥ 1 is
H0t = {a01, a02, . . . , a0t−1}, and the set of all possible action
histories of eNode B at stage t is denoted by H0t .
Since the optimal strategies of both players do not depend
on the action history of the uninformed player eNode B [14],
the behavior strategy σt of the jammer at stage t is defined as
a mapping from Θ×Hjt to ∆(Aj), and the behavior strategy
τt of eNode B at stage t is a mapping from Hjt to ∆(A0).
The behavior strategies of jammer and eNode B are denoted
by σ = (σt)∞t=1 and τ = (τt)
∞
t=1, and the set of all possible
behavior strategies are denoted by Σ and T , respectively.
This article considers a λ-discounted utility function as the
overall utility function in the infinite horizon game. The λ-
discounted utility function is commonly used in both classic
and modern game-theoretic literature (cf. [11], [13]–[15],
[18]). The main reason for selecting discounted utility formula-
tion is its guarantee of convergence in infinite-horizon games.
If average utility formulation is selected then the overall
payoff is taken as a limit, which may or may not exist. Also,
uniformity conditions are required for equilibrium in average
utility formulations [11]. It is also shown in [14] that as
λ→ 0, the game value of a discounted infinite-horizon game
converges to that of an average reward game. It is to be noted
here that λ is merely a mathematical constant dictating the
discount factor and does not represent any physical quantity
like received signal strength or SNR etc. The λ-discounted
utility function is defined as follows:
uλ(p0, σ, τ) = Ep0,σ,τ
[ ∞∑
t=1
λ(1− λ)t−1U(θ, ajt , a0t )
]
(11)
Discounted utility represents the idea that players often
focus more on current reward and apply a discount fac-
tor of (1 − λ) to future reward. Based on the discounted
utility function, jammer has a security level V (p0) =
maxσ∈Σ minτ∈T uλ(p0, σ, τ) which is the maximum utility
it can get in the game if eNode B always plays the best
response strategy. The strategy σ∗ that guarantees this value
no matter what strategy eNode B plays is called the jammer’s
security strategy. Similarly, eNode B’s security level is defined
as V¯ (p0) = minτ∈T maxσ∈Σ uλ(p0, σ, τ), and the strategy
τ∗ that guarantees the security level no matter what strategy
jammer plays is called eNode B’s security strategy. If the
security levels of both players are the same, which is true
in our case, it can be said that the game has a value Vλ(p0),
and there exists a Nash Equilibrium.
This article is concerned with the security strategies of
both players. However, in our case, the system has multiple
states and the game is played with the lack of information
on one side. Li et al. showed that the security strategies
for both the players in finite-horizon asymmetric informa-
tion repeated zero-sum games depend only on the informed
player’s history actions [19]. For the infinite-horizon games,
this would imply utilizing large amount of memories to record
the history actions. It is, therefore, necessary for the players
to find fixed-size sufficient statistics for decision making in
λ-discounted infinite-horizon games. However, it is still non-
trivial to compute optimal security strategies even with fixed-
size sufficient statistics. Therefore, Li & Shamma provided
approximated security strategies with guaranteed performance
to solve infinite-horizon games [20].
A. The Smart Jammer’s Approximated Security Strategy Algo-
rithm
Since jammer’s behavior strategy depends on the type of the
jammer, the type of the jammer may be revealed through the
action history of the jammer. The revelation is characterized by
the conditional probability pt over Θ conditioned on jammer’s
action history Hjt , which is updated as follows
pθt+1(H
j
t+1) = pi(pt, xt, a
j
t ) =
pθt (H
j
t )x
θ
t (a
j
t )
x¯pt,xt(a
j
t )
(12)
with p1 = p0 and x¯pt,xt(a
j
t ) =
∑
θ∈Θ p
θ
t (H
j
t )x
θ
t (a
j
t ) repre-
sents weighted average of xt. The conditional probability pt
is also called the belief state which is the sufficient statistics
for the informed player, the jammer, to make a decision at
stage t. It was shown in [14] that the informed player has a
stationary security strategy that only depends on pt, and the
game value Vλ(p0) satisfies the following recursive equation
Vλ(p0) = max
x∈∆(Aj)|Θ|
min
y∈∆(A0)
[
λ
∑
θ∈Θ
pθ0x
θTUθy
+ (1− λ)Tp0,x(Vλ)
] (13)
where xθ represents jammer’s behavioral strategy given state
θ, y represents eNode B’s behavioral strategy, and Tp,x(Vλ) =∑
aj∈Aj x¯p,x(a
j)Vλ(pi(p, x, a
j)). Although the game value
Vλ(pt) from a stage t, ∀t 6= 1 to the end of the game changes
as pt evolves with time, the game value Vλ(p0) from the first
stage t = 1 to the end of the game remains the same as p0 is
fixed.
It is non-convex to compute Vλ(p) and the corresponding
security strategies [23] and, therefore, an approximated strat-
egy is proposed. The basic idea is to use the game value
Vλ,T (p) of a T stage λ discounted asymmetric repeated game
to approximate the game value Vλ,T (p), and compute the
approximated security strategy based on the approximated
game value Vλ,T (p). Define the jammer’s stationary behavior
strategy as σ¯ : Θ × ∆(Θ) → ∆(Aj). The approximated
stationary security strategy is
σ¯(:, p) = arg max
x∈∆(Aj)|Θ|
min
y∈∆(A0)
[
λ
∑
θ∈Θ
pθxθ
TUθy
+ (1− λ)Tp,x(Vλ,T )
] (14)
where σ¯(:, p) is an |Aj | × |Θ| matrix whose θ th column is
σ¯λ,T (θ, p).
Furthermore, Li & Shamma constructed a linear program
to compute the approximated game value Vλ,T+1(p) and
9corresponding approximated security strategy σ¯(θ, p). It was
shown that Vλ,T+1(p) satisfies the following linear program
in the λ-discounted zero-sum asymmetric game Γλ(p):
Vλ,T+1(p) = max
q,l
T+1∑
t=1
∑
Hjt∈Hjt
λ(1− λ)t−1lHjt
 (15)
s.t.
∑
θ∈Θ,aj∈Aj
qt+1
(
θ, (Hjt , a
j)
)
Uθaj ,: ≥ lHjt 1
T , (16)
∀t = 1, 2, ....., T + 1, Hjt ∈ Hjt (17)
q1(H
j
1 ; θ) = 1,∀θ ∈ Θ, (18)∑
ajt∈Aj
qt+1((H
j
t , a
j
t ); θ) = qt(H
j
t ; θ),∀θ ∈ Θ, Hjt ∈ Hjt ,
∀t = 1, . . . , T, (19)
qt(H
j
t ; θ) ≥ 0,∀θ ∈ Θ, Hjt ∈ Hjt ,
∀t = 2, . . . , T + 1, (20)
where q ∈ Q is a set of all properly dimensioned real
vectors, L is a properly dimensioned real space, and (Hjt , a
j
t )
corresponds to a concatenation. The approximated security
strategy is
σ¯a
j
(θ, p) = q∗2(a
j ; θ),∀aj ∈ Aj (21)
where q∗2 is the optimal solution of the linear program in (15)
- (20). The curious reader is encouraged to see [20] for further
details.
1) The Algorithm: The LP-based algorithm for the in-
formed player to compute its approximated security strategy
and update belief state in λ-discounted asymmetric repeated
game is presented as follows [20]:
1) Initialization:
a) Read payoff matrices U , prior probability p0,
and system state θ.
b) Set receding horizon length T .
c) Let t = 1, and p1 = p0.
2) Compute the informed player’s approximated secu-
rity strategy σ¯λ,T based on (21) with p = pt.
3) Choose an action aj ∈ Aj according to the proba-
bility σ¯λ,T (θ, pt), and announce it publicly.
4) Update the belief state pt+1 according to (12).
5) Update t = t+ 1 and go to step 2.
B. The eNode B’s Approximated Security Strategy Algorithm
The uninformed player does not have access to the informed
player’s strategy or belief state pt, therefore, pt cannot serve
as its sufficient statistics. The sufficient statistics of the unin-
formed player, eNode B, was shown to be the anti-discounted
regret which will be explained further. The regret µθt (H
j
t )
in state θ is defined as the difference between the expected
realized utility so far and the security level of eNode B’s
security strategy, given state θ, i.e.,
µθt (H
j
t ) = Eτ
(
t−1∑
s=1
λ(1− λ)s−1U j(ajs, a0s)|θ,Hjt
)
− µθ∗
where
µθ∗ = max
σ(θ)∈Σ(θ)
Eσ(θ),τ∗
( ∞∑
s=1
λ(1− λ)s−1U j(ajs, a0s)|θ
)
,
τ∗ is eNode B’s security strategy, σ(θ) indicates jammer’s
behavior strategy given θ ∈ Θ, and Σ(θ) is the corresponding
set including all σ(θ). The anti-discounted regret is defined as
wθt (H
j
t ) =
µθt (H
j
t )
(1− λ)t−1 ,∀θ ∈ Θ,
and is updated according to
wθt+1(H
j
t , a
j
t ) =
wθt (H
j
t ) + λUθ(ajt , :)τ(Hjt )
1− λ ,∀θ ∈ Θ, (22)
where Uθ(ajt , :) is the ajt th row of matrix Uθ.
Computation of the security level µ∗ of eNode B’s security
strategy is non-convex [20]. Therefore, an approximated secu-
rity level µθ? is used, which is the security level of eNode B’s
security strategy given state θ in T -stage λ-discounted asym-
metric repeated game. The approximated security level µθ? is
computed according to the following linear program:
min
y∈Y,l∈R|Θ|
∑
θ∈Θ
pθlθ (23)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
λ(1− λ)t−1Uθ(ajt , :)yHjT ≤ l
θ,∀θ ∈ Θ,
∀HjT ∈ HjT , ajt ∈ Aj , (24)
1T yHjt
= 1,∀Hjt ∈ Hjt ,∀t = 1, ...., T, (25)
yHjt
≥ 0,∀Hjt ∈ Hjt ,∀t = 1, ...., T (26)
where Y is properly-dimensioned real space. The approxi-
mated security level is µθ? = l∗, where l∗ is the optimal
solution to the LP problem (23-26).
The eNode B has a stationary security strategy that only
depends on the anti-discounted regret wt [20]. Define eNode
B’s stationary behavior strategy as τ¯ : R|θ| → ∆(A0).
Computation of the stationary security strategy of eNode B
is non-convex [20]. Therefore, an approximated stationary
security strategy τ¯(w) of eNode B is proposed in [20], which
can be computed by solving the following LP problem.
min
y∈Y,l∈R|Θ|,L∈R
L (27)
s.t. w + l ≤ L1, (28)
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s.t.
T+1∑
t=1
λ(1− λ)t−1Uθ(aj , :)yHjT+1 ≤ l
θ,∀θ ∈ Θ,
∀HjT+1 ∈ HjT+1, aj ∈ Aj , (29)
1T yHjt
= 1,∀Hjt ∈ Hjt ,∀t = 1, ...., T + 1, (30)
yHjt
≥ 0,∀Hjt ∈ Hjt ,∀t = 1, ...., T + 1 (31)
where Y is properly-dimensioned real space. The uninformed
player’s approximated security strategy τ¯(w) is y∗
Hj1
. The
curious reader is encouraged to see [20] for further details.
1) The Algorithm: The LP-based algorithm for the unin-
formed player to compute its approximated security strategy in
λ-discounted asymmetric repeated game Γλ(p0) is presented
as follows [20]:
1) Initialization:
a) Read payoff matrices U , and prior probability
p0.
b) Set receding horizon length T .
c) Solve the LP problem (23) - (26) with p = p0
and let µ∗ = l∗.
d) Let t = 1 and w1 = −µ∗.
2) Solve the LP problem (27) - (31) with w = wt,
and the uninformed player’s approximated security
strategy τ¯(wt) is y∗Hj1
.
3) Choose an action a0 ∈ A0 according to the proba-
bility τ¯(wt), and announce it publicly.
4) Read the informed player’s action, and update the
anti-discounted regret wt+1 according to (22).
5) Update t = t+ 1 and go to Step 2.
It is to be noted here that jamming sense is still required
by the network, i.e., the network has to first decide whether it
is under jamming attack or not in order to invoke the above-
mentioned algorithm.
C. The eNode B’s Expected Security Strategy Algorithm
The “expected strategy” algorithm for the eNode B is
defined as a simplex ∆ over its complete-information single-
shot game security strategies σ1 with the same probability
as prior p0. In other words, the eNode B would play the
complete-information single-shot security strategies σ1|θ = 1
and σ1|θ = 2 with the probabilities p10 and p20 respectively.
Since, the prior is common knowledge, it alleviates eNode B
from “learning” and full monitoring in a repeated game. Thus,
the eNode B essentially plays a single-shot strategy in a
repeated game but without the requirements of full monitoring,
which may not be such a bad idea if the jammer plays “non-
revealing” strategies. Furthermore, the network does not need
to observe the jammer’s action with certainty that leads to
more practical implementations. Both discounted and average
payoff formulations can be used with this algorithm. It is to
be noted here that the expected security strategy algorithm is
novel and not based on a prior work.
In the next section, the approximated security strategy
and expected security strategy algorithms are used to design
strategies for both the smart jammer and the LTE network. The
λ-discounted cost formulation is used for both the algorithms
in the infinite-horizon game.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF REPEATED GAME
STRATEGY ALGORITHMS
The zero-sum game-theoretic algorithms presented earlier
are used to devise “approximated” strategy formulations for
both the players in a λ-discounted utility sense. However, these
algorithms require full monitoring, i.e. the network has to ob-
serve jammer’s action at every stage with certainty. Therefore,
the “expected” formulation is devised in which the network
being the uninformed player simply plays its single-shot best
response in an expected sense, i.e., it would play single-shot
Best Response (BR) with the same probability distribution as
the prior probability (which is common knowledge) of the
jammer occurrence. This enables the network to alleviate full
monitoring requirement, i.e., the network does not have to
observe the jammer’s action with certainty and leads to more
practical implementations.
The performance of both “approximated” and “expected”
algorithms for discounted utility formulations is characterized
in the following section. However, not all of the simulation
results can be shared here due to space constraints. The fol-
lowing parameters were used for both the players in repeated
game simulations (in addition to the single-shot case): discount
factor λ = 0.90 and receding horizon length T = 4. It is to be
noted here that the receding horizon length of T = 4 is chosen
for simulation efficiency purposes and almost the same results
are obtained at higher values of T.
A. eNode B vs. Cheater
1) Jammer Strategy: When the Cheater (θ = 1) is in the
network, it always uses its “approximated” algorithm to devise
repeated game strategy against the network. Also, being the
informed player, there is no ambiguity about the system state
so Cheater can decide to reveal its superior information as
much as it suits it. The Cheater’s steady state belief state pt
and repeated game strategy vs. prior probability are shown
in Figs. 1 and 2, respectively, where p1 and p2 represent
updated belief (probability) about the states θ = 1 and
θ = 2, respectively, and akj represents kth pure action of the
Cheater. It is interesting to note that the Cheater always plays
the same security (pure) strategy (play a3j = ’Jam CS-RS +
PUCCH’) that it uses for a single-shot game, independent
of the prior probability. It is also interesting to know that
Cheater’s strategies are non-revealing 4, even at a relatively
low prior probability of its occurrence when p10 ≥ 0.25.
This means that the network does not “learn” anything new
about the jammer type from jammer’s repeated actions despite
4The informed player is said to play non-revealing at stage n when the
posterior probabilities in (12) do not change at that stage if its mixed move at
stage n is independent of the state θ ∈ Θ for all values of θ for which pθn > 0.
In case when full monitoring is assumed, not revealing the information is
equivalent to not using that information, [15].
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Fig. 1: Cheater’s Steady State Belief State vs. Prior p10
Fig. 2: Cheater’s Steady State Approximated Security Strategy
vs. Prior p10
full monitoring when p10 ≥ 0.25 and Cheater takes full
advantage of its superior information. At relatively low prior
probability of Cheater’s occurrence (p10 < 0.25), the jammer
reveals very little information in the first stage when the belief
state gets updated to p0 = [0.25 0.75]T , but it remains the
same after that. For instance, Fig. 3 shows the evoluation of
Cheater’s belief state and its strategy at every stage when the
prior probability is p10 = 0.05. This puts the network at a
disadvantageous position in the game if the network plays as
a Bayesian player, even when it can observe jammer’s actions
perfectly at every stage.
2) eNode B Strategies: The eNode B’s steady state “ap-
proximated” and “expected” security strategies vs. prior prob-
ability p10 are plotted in Figs. 4, and 5, respectively, where
ak0 represents kth pure action of the eNode B. The network’s
strategies (both “expected” and “approximated”) evolve with
varying prior probability levels as it is the uninformed player.
The “approximated” strategy relies on full monitoring and
Fig. 3: Cheater’s Belief & Strategy vs. Time when p10 = 0.05
Fig. 4: eNode B’s Steady State Approximated Security Strat-
egy against Cheater vs. Prior p10
switches to a different strategy at p10 ≥ 0.35, when it
starts playing a30 = ‘Throttling’ (its security strategy against
Cheater in complete-information single-shot game) in addition
to playing a40 = ‘Change fc’. On the other hand, the “expected”
algorithm does not rely on full monitoring and, hence, uses
an expectation of its single-shot strategies involving playing
mixed strategy over ‘Normal’, ‘Throttling’ and ‘Change Tim-
ing’. The “expected” strategy is pre-computed based on the
prior probability and does not change as the game proceeds,
whereas the “approximated” algorithm converges in around
12 stages. The “expected” strategy algorithm may work well
enough for the network as the jammer’s strategies are mostly
non-revealing and the “approximated” algorithm requires full
monitoring.
3) eNode B’s λ-discounted Utilities: A snapshot of both
eNode B and Cheater’s actions and eNode B’s utility at every
stage is shown in Fig. 6 for λ = 0.90 and p10 = 0.05.
It is apparent that the eNode B’s (hence, Cheater’s) utility
stabilizes very quickly at the beginning of the game - a
trend that is observed throughout the repeated game. The eN-
ode B’s “approximated” and “expected” λ-discounted utility
values against Cheater are plotted in Fig. 7 at different prior
probability p10 levels. The “approximated security” algorithm
12
Fig. 5: eNode B’s Expected Strategy vs. Prior p10
Fig. 6: Players’ Actions & Utility vs. Time when p10 = 0.05
performs almost optimally when p10 ≥ 0.35, whereas the
“expected” algorithm performs poorly as compared to the
“approximated” algorithm with the exception of low prior
values. The “approximated” algorithm uses full monitoring
and repeated game linear programming (LP) formulation to
compute its strategy and, hence, performs much better than
its counterpart. On the other hand, the “expected” algorithm
only relies on the prior probability and does not observe
the jammer’s actions and, hence, ends up underperforming
even when the jammer uses its single-shot security strategy.
When prior probability for Cheater’s occurrence is low (i.e.,
p10 < 0.35), eNode B strategies fail to even come close to the
complete-information single-shot value. This happens due to
the fact that it is rather unlikely for the Cheater to be present
in the network at such low prior value and eNode B strategy
algorithms are not robust enough to address this problem.
B. eNode B vs. Saboteur
1) Jammer Strategy: Similar to the eNode B vs. Cheater
game, Saboteur’s steady state belief states pt and “approx-
imated security” strategies vs. prior probability of its oc-
currence p20 are shown in Figs. 8 and 9, respectively. It
is very interesting to note that being the informed player,
Saboteur plays non-revealing and “misleading” strategies
Fig. 7: eNode B’s Utility against Cheater vs. Prior p10
even at prior probability values as high as p20 = 0.75 (this
value goes up to p20 = 0.85 for λ = 0.70). It plays its
type θ = 1 (Cheater) dominant security strategy (play a3j =
’Jam CS-RS + PUCCH’) while actually being a type θ = 2
(Saboteur) jammer. For example, Fig. 10 shows the evoluation
of Saboteur’s belief state and its strategy at every stage when
the prior probability is p20 = 0.80. At high prior probability
values of 0.75 < p20 < 0.90, the jammer’s belief state goes
through a transition period because the network forces it to
reveal its true identity by playing a40 with certainty. Hence,
the belief state eventually settles down to the completely-
revealing state of p2 = 1. During the transition period when
the jammer’s belief state converges to p2 = 1, it plays its
single-shot security strategy for state θ = 2, i.e., play a2j =
’Jam CS-RS’ and a5j = ’Jam CS-RS + PUCCH + PCFICH
+ PRACH’ with almost the same probability. At very high
prior probability levels of p20 ≥ 0.90, the state information
(θ = 2) is completely revealed and the jammer plays its
single-shot security strategy for state θ = 2 as mentioned
above. Hence, the jammer uses its superior information to
its complete advantage even when full monitoring is allowed.
This is a good example of the strength of superior information
and how it can be exploited in asymmetric games against an
adversary.
2) eNode B Strategies: Similar to the repeated game against
Cheater, the eNode B adapts its repeated game strategy
against Saboteur as the game proceeds. From the simulations,
eNode B’s strategy seems to converge in 12 stages. The
“expected” strategy is shown in Fig. 11 and is deployed similar
to the game against Cheater. Since, the “expected” strategy
algorithm is oblivious to the actual jammer type and does not
use full monitoring, its mixed strategy does not depend on
the system state θ and is played solely based on the prior
probability value.
On the other hand, the “approximated” security strategy
algorithm relies on the repeated game and full monitoring to
adapt its strategy. The network’s steady state “approximated”
strategy vs. prior probability p20 is plotted in Fig. 12. As
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Fig. 8: Saboteur’s Steady State Belief State vs. Prior p20
Fig. 9: Saboteur’s Steady State Approximated Security Strat-
egy vs. Prior p20
Fig. 10: Saboteur’s Belief & Strategy vs. Time when p20 = 0.80
Fig. 11: eNode B’s Expected Strategy vs. Prior p20
Fig. 12: eNode B’s Steady State Approximated Security Strat-
egy against Saboteur vs. Prior p20
discussed above, the jammer plays completely non-revealing
and misleading strategies for p20 ≤ 0.75 and, hence, eNode B
gets tricked into believing that it is playing against Cheater
(θ = 1), when in fact it is playing against the Saboteur (θ = 2).
This leads the network to play the same strategy that it played
against Cheater until p20 ≤ 0.70. At 0.70 ≤ p20 ≤ 0.75, the
network plays a40 = ’Change frequency’ with certainty to force
the jammer to reveal its state. When the jammer starts playing
its security strategy for state θ = 2 at high prior values, the
network switches to its own security strategy against Saboteur
and plays a10 = ’Normal’ + a
5
0 = ’Change Timing’. The network
also plays a20 = ’Pilot Boosting’ with a very low probability.
This trend continues whenever the network observes (due to
full monitoring) the jammer playing its state θ = 2 security
strategies. It is curious to see how the network gets tricked
by the jammer even with full monitoring because it lacks
information about the system state.
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Fig. 13: Players’ Actions & Utility vs. Time when p20 = 0.80
3) eNode B’s λ-discounted Utilities: A snapshot of both
eNode B and Saboteur’s actions and eNode B’s utility at every
stage is shown in Fig. 13 for λ = 0.90 and p20 = 0.80. Similar
to the game against Cheater, eNode B’s (hence, Saboteur’s)
utility stabilizes very quickly at the beginning of the game. The
network’s λ-discounted utility values for both “approximated”
and “expected” security strategy algorithms are plotted against
prior probability p20 in Fig. 14. The jammer strategies are
mostly non-revealing and, hence, eNode B does not seem
to “learn” much about the jammer type from its repeated
interaction. Therefore, the “approximated security strategy”
formulation seems to perform very poorly until p20 < 0.70. At
p20 = 0.70, the eNode B switches its strategy to playing a
4
0 =
’Change fc’ and catches up to the optimal value at p20 ≥ 0.80.
Obviously, the jammer also uses full monitoring and is forced
to come out and play revealing strategy at p20 ≥ 0.90.
On the other hand, the “expected strategy” algorithm seems
to perform better than the “approximated security strategy” as
it does not get tricked by the jammer’s non-revealing strategies
due to its oblivion. It appears that the “expected strategy”
algorithm outperforms its counterpart when p10 ≤ 0.30 (or
equivalently, p20 ≥ 0.70) given that the Cheater (θ = 1)
is present in the network and p20 ≤ 0.70 (or equivalently,
p10 ≥ 0.30) when Saboteur (θ = 2) is present in the network.
Thus, it performs better in low prior probability regions, when
eNode B does not expect a certain jammer type in the network.
Nevertheless, it becomes clear that the network is at a very
disadvantageous position in the game against the smart jammer
due to its lack of information and can be easily misled by
the jammer. Furthermore, the “approximated” and “expected”
strategy algorithms work in a complementary sense in favor
of the network.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, the smart jammer and eNode B dynamics
are modeled as a strictly competitive (zero-sum) repeated
asymmetric game with incomplete information and lack of
information on the network side. The solution of a complete-
information single-shot game is based on very familiar security
strategies that lead to a Nash equilibrium. However, tractable
optimal strategy formulations for infinite-horizon asymmetric
repeated games do not exist in game-theoretic literature,
Fig. 14: eNode B’s Utility against Saboteur vs. Prior p20
especially for the uninformed player. Therefore, efficient LP
formulations from a recent work are used for “approximated”
security strategy computation for both players that requires full
monitoring. Therefore, a simplistic yet effective “expected”
security strategy algorithm is also devised for the network that
does not require full monitoring.
This article also presents and discusses performance charac-
terization of the above-mentioned algorithms. It turns out that
the jammer is able to play non-revealing strategies most of the
time, which implies that the network is unable to learn any
new information about the jammer type in repeated games.
Hence, at low prior values, the network performs worse (or
equivalently, smart jammer performs better) in repeated games
as compared to the complete-information single-shot game.
In the game against the Cheater, the “approximated security
strategy” algorithm is able to strategize against the Cheater
rather quickly and achieves its optimal utility because the
jammer plays its single-shot game security strategy in repeated
game. However, this advantage goes away in the game against
the Saboteur, when the jammer plays misleading strategies for
a wide range of prior probabilities. Nevertheless, the network’s
algorithm eventually catches up and forces the jammer to
reveal its true type.
The unique “expected security strategy” algorithm per-
forms equally well or sometimes better than its counterpart
“approximated security strategy” algorithm against the type
Saboteur. This is due to the fact that it does not get duped
by the “misinformation” spread by the jammer due to lack of
full monitoring, which plays at its advantage. However, the
former algorithm performs better than the latter at low prior
probability values against the type Cheater because the smart
jammer always plays its single-shot game security strategy.
Nevertheless, the biggest advantage of “expected strategy”
algorithm comes from the fact that it does not require full
monitoring and, hence, can be easily deployed in practical
networks.
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